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ON THEORETICAL BASES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PRINCIPLES AND SYSTEMS OF REAR SUPPORT

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CPYRGHT

by Col I. ZHERNOSEK

It is not easy to recognize the objective rules and historical trends in the development of principles and systems of rear support of the Armed Forces. This area of military affairs is in direct dependence not only upon factors of a purely military nature but also upon the whole country's economy.

Because of this there is great interest in scientific research on the entire complex of conditions and factors which determine the development of the armed forces rear area and the development of scientific methods for solving problems of rear support in modern conditions.

Our scientific thought recognizes the fact that until recently the rules of armed conflict were investigated very slowly for a number of reasons. The theoretical bases for the development of principles and systems of rear support, which are directly dependent upon the study of bases for the development of military affairs as a whole, were naturally studied to an even lesser degree. In this area, we did not possess truly scientific generalizations and, as a result, individual, basic problems were sometimes solved without necessary consideration for objective laws and only on the basis of some officials' experience and intuition.

In our time when a true revolution is occurring in military affairs, scientific thought is faced with the full-scale task of studying the scientific principles in the further development of military affairs, including problems of the rear area.

The role and place of the rear in the overall complex of problems in the military establishment and armed defense of a socialist state are defined in the works by F. Engels and V. I. Lenin on military problems. They scientifically proved the dependence of the course and outcome of any war on the economy of belligerent countries and the stability of their rear area.

The stability of the rear determines the course and outcome of the war; it includes the entire country, its economy, political structure, economic structure, all state and public institutions, population, etc. Therefore, efficient operations of the rear during a war and the uninterrupted satisfaction of the needs of a country engaged in war (not only its armed forces), are provided by the political and state leadership of the country and not by the military command. The solution of problems in providing the required rear stability during a war presents

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a subject for research by many sciences and primarily those of historical materialism, economics, history and other social and natural sciences.

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The concept of the rear in its broader sense, as given in the works of F. Engels and V. I. Lenin, is far from identical with the concept of the rear as a part of the armed forces which provides general support in accordance with the conditions of the conduct of battles and operations.

Research on the theoretical bases for rear support of the armed forces is a subject for military science. It must be conducted with consideration of the objective laws which determine the development of military affairs as a whole.

Take, for example, the influence of politics and economics on the development of principles and systems of rear support. Marxism-Leninism defines each war as the continuation of politics by forceful means. Politics not only determines the outbreak of wars and their aims, but it also manifested in all forms of combat employed in war.

Certain aspects of a war's political goals also appear in the system of rear support for the armed forces. Experience gained in the Civil War in the USSR serves as an extremely clear illustration of the thoroughness with which political factors must be considered in developing a system for rear support. The Communist Party, led by the great Lenin, established a system of rear support for the Red Army during the Civil War which facilitated the maximum effective utilization of the extremely limited resources available and at the same time created favorable conditions for strengthening fraternal ties between the young revolutionary army and the working masses.

At each stage of the Great Patriotic War there was careful consideration of the political aspects in all actions of rear support to our armed forces.

The dependence of war on the economy, as scientifically proved by the classics of Marxism and Leninism, has been confirmed by the practice of all wars.

While politics, as seen in the first example, has a direct influence on the rear support system as a whole, the development level of production forces and the economic potential represent the prime base not only for the rear support system as whole but also for all its functional principles.

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The coordination between the rear support system of the Soviet Armed Forces and the production forces, as well as the economic and socio-political structure of our country, has always facilitated the maximum effective utilization of all resources for the performance of defense and primary national economy tasks.

The dependence of rear support systems and principles on economic factors in the present stage gives essentially new significance to timely economic preparation of a country to repel, aggression, requires the use of new forms of mobilization preparation, and attaches special importance to estimating the economic potential of the socialist common wealth countries. These factors attain special significance for the correct solution of problems in developing techniques for rear support.

The examples cited show that the system of organization and the principles of rear support are developed under the influence of objective factors and laws which determine the development of military affairs as a whole. It must be noted that this area of the problem has been studied and discussed to a certain extent in scientific literature.

In regard to the laws which reflect the development of the actual rear support system, as one of the most important aspects of military activities, there has been considerably less attention given to theoretical principles in this area.

Therefore, I would like to devote primary attention to the following objective laws:

- between the rear support system and the level of development achieved in troop organization and military art;

- the constant increase in the dependence of each operation, engagement, and battle on the efficient organization of rear operations, in order to achieve success;

- the increase in requirements for decreasing the interval between the forces and systems of higher rear echelons and the supported forces;

- an increase in mobility of the rear;

- the growth in importance of operational control.

Among the facts cited, the greatest importance is attached to the constant correlation of rear support systems to the achieved level of organizational development in the forces and in military art.

CPYRCA The history of military art clearly shows that in connection with change in tactics and the development of operational art, changes were made in the forces and systems of rear support, their organization and principles of operation. Through the tests of many wars over a number of centuries, there developed a system of rear support, and the troop rear underwent changes as it progressed from independent commercial enterprises to an inseparable component at all levels of military organization.

In the 47 years of the Soviet Armed Forces development, the rear support system has undergone three fundamental changes which found expression in appropriate reforms. I have in mind the military reform of 1924-1928, reorganization of the rear in the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War, and the fundamental changes which were made in the troop rear support system in the postwar years.

Violation of the principle of constant correlation of the rear support system to combat operational techniques was especially felt in rear operations at the start of the post war.

The first months of the Great Patriotic War, during which our army retreated and did not have a unified rear services organization, confirmed the serious consequences resulting from neglect of this important principle.

A similar conclusion may be drawn from the experience of foreign countries. For example, the US Army at the beginning of the war, had a large number of supply and support services that were unrelated. The fallacy of this system became apparent at the outset of war and by Presidential Order of 8 March 1942, i.e. soon after US entry into the war, support systems were created and were headed by the appropriate commands.

In both cases, the restructuring of the rear organization was conducted at the outset of the war and had a single goal -- to abolish the negative effect of an obsolete system of rear organization on the course of military operations. Now, when military operations of an initial war period have a decisive effect on its outcome, a basic reconstruction of the rear support system in the first months of a war could reduce the operational effectiveness of excellently armed and trained forces or even nullify their efforts.

The stern requirements of our times are that new techniques must be developed, introduced in troop practice, and completely mastered by the forces prior to commencement of military operations. While in past epochs of the long evolutionary development, errors and omissions in military art and military science could be corrected during a war, failures in the present highly dynamic conditions have potentially grave consequences.

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In general, the present conditions require that decisive steps to the organization and operational principles of the rear must be taken much more frequently than in the past. This conclusion is completely logical and stems from Marxist-Leninist teachings.

History has demonstrated that, as society has developed at each new stage, the objective factors for the subsequent progressive leaps have developed more rapidly. Each new era, in itself, is the outcome of a higher level of productive forces and consequently, it has the requisite material conditions for a more dynamic development from the very start.

Such a theory is wholly applicable to war as a sociological phenomenon and, therefore, to the development of a rear support system.

Success in each operation, engagement, and battle depends on an efficiently organized operation of the rear support system, on the timely and uninterrupted satisfaction of troop requirements for necessary supplies, and on the survivability and maneuverability of that system.

First of all, attention should be devoted to the constant growth in the operational scope of rear support and its related tendency to increase the forces and systems of the rear.

The growth of material expenditures in war and of operations is characteristic of each stage in the history of wars and military art. Ammunition expenditure during the Great Patriotic War was almost eight times greater than for World War I. Fuel consumption was also drastically increased.

In preparation for each strategic offensive operation in the Great Patriotic War, the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, the General Staff, and central organs of the armed forces rear, the military councils of fronts and armies, and organs of the operational and troop rear performed a volume of work in the organization of uninterrupted rear support to the forces that was unparalleled in history.

There is no basis for the assumption that material expenditures for an operation will be significantly reduced with the advent of nuclear weapons and other systems of mass destruction. The intensity and great dynamics of combat operations, as well as the high level of mechanization of troops and automation of armaments, will evidently cause a further growth in material expenditures.

In discussing a quantitative growth of materiel expenditures, I have in mind more than a simple increase in amounts of materiel. Included is an increase in labor consumption for production of each unit of materiel employed by the Armed Forces. In fact, is it possible to compare the labor consumed in production of modern types of armament or transportation, or even of equipment with corresponding indicators at the beginning of our century?

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Attention must also be devoted to the development of new types of materiel expenditures for battles and operations. With the advent of new types of weapons, the variety of materiel used by forces during execution of combat missions is expanded.

For example, in World War I, the base for logistical support was made up of supply categories such as rations and artillery (ammunition, supply).

In the Great Patriotic War, there was a sharp increase in the proportion of fuel for aviation, tanks, and motor transport. The varieties of equipment and munitions were expanded. This increased the dependence of the preparation and course of an operation on timely and complete support of the forces with all required supplies.

Timeliness and completeness in supporting the forces with missiles are now becoming the prime criterion in evaluating their readiness to execute combat missions. Tens of types of fuel and a tremendous number of inventory items in lubricants have necessarily been introduced into supply channels for support of modern equipment. Munition inventories increased both at the operational level and in a soyedineniye, regiment, and even in a potrazdeleniye.

Many thousands of technical items (units assemblies, parts, spare parts) will be required on a daily basis and in large numbers.

Specialists have calculated that the present ratio of all technical support systems in the overall volume of a front's logistics have grown by one-and-a-half to two times in comparison to the Patriotic War period.

In these conditions, the success of each operation and each battle becomes vitally dependent on the functioning of the rear support system and on the rear's capability for timely delivery to the forces of all that is necessary in the amounts and types required.

A timely launch of a missile with a nuclear warhead depends not only on accurate and efficient work by staffs of the missile forces and operational control elements, but also to a considerable extent on coordinated synchronized operations of the system of rear elements - from the center to and including the forces' rear units.

The increased dependence of operational success on timeliness and completeness of rear support to the forces in a situation where the enemy employs weapons of mass destruction has created the need for conducting a number of measures to establish reliable survival conditions for the rear itself.

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new types of rear support, it naturally becomes necessary to reinforce the existing rear elements, increase their productive capability, and establish improved rear units and enterprises. However, this conflicts with the constant striving for maximum reduction in the number of service units in the combat forces components.

During a period of drastic changes in military affairs this seemingly insurmountable conflict may be eliminated only through development of a qualitatively new system and new principles of rear support, which would establish conditions for effective employment of available forces and systems in accordance with the new requirements of military art and the changes in troop organization.

Consequently, the increased dependence of operations on the reliable work of the rear has always been an objective rule in the development of a system and of the principles of rear support.

The constant requirement for bringing the forces and systems of the higher echelon rear elements closer to the supported forces is a natural tendency, which has existed throughout the historical development of military art.

The practical manifestation of this historical tendency is interesting in that during earlier stages of military development there was a gradual differentiation of the basic rear units for the purpose of bringing the designated forces and systems closer to the supported troops.

Thus, between the central rear units and the center of troops, an operational link was established. Later on, battalion and regimental units appeared in the troop rear, while frontal and army echelons appeared at the operational level. With a growth in troop requirements and an increase in operational maneuverability, the forces and systems of each individual rear echelon became insufficient to satisfy the requirements for autonomous action by the supported troops.

Because of this, prior to World War II the search began for a type of rear organization which would permit the employment, if necessary of forces and systems from higher rear echelons to support the troops in operations.

Many various forms and techniques for closing the gap between central systems and the supported troops were developed in practice during the Great Patriotic War. During the war, rear control elements were established under the commanders in chief of sectors and the representatives of the Supreme High Command Stavka at the fronts. Central bases were moved up to the front operational sectors and in a number of cases the center directly performed tasks in support of independent operational

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ob'yedineniya. The center constantly maintained a considerable portion of its forces and systems near the active troops and deployed them in the frontal zone.

In the work of the operational and troop rears, the constant draw on forces and systems of higher echelons to the supported troops was, in general, an unchanging principle throughout the entire Great Patriotic War.

In the development of new principles for organization of the operational rear in the postwar period, there has again been an attempt to draw the operational rear's forces and systems closer to the supported soyedineniya. .

All rear support forces and systems to be deployed in the frontline rear zone in a nuclear missile war must operate in close cooperation and mutual support, without duplicating one another. It will often be necessary to unite the efforts of all rear echelons to execute the main missions at each given stage. In the future, this unity of efforts will be required during support to large-scale regrouping of troops, commitment of advancing ob'yedineniya, and in other instances. Also, a large number of soyedineniya under present conditions must be supported by forces and systems of the front's rear echelon. Certain types of materiel must be supplied directly to the troops from the center's arsenals and bases.

All of this indicates that it is urgently necessary to make a serious study of ways to solve the problem of bringing higher echelon rear forces and systems closer to the supported troops and to create conditions for their maneuver according to a unified plan, independently of echelon subordination.

Military commanders have devoted special attention to an increase in mobility and maneuverability of rear support systems and forces to match the maneuverability of supported troops ever since the establishment of regular armies. Thus, in the armies of the principal western countries since the 17th century the "5-stage" magazine supply system has been firmly introduced. This system was based on the principle of outfitting armies of mercenaries and it met an urgent requirement of military art -- to enable the troops to operate over a given period of time without halts to establish new bases.

An essentially different means of making rear mobility to the maneuverability of supported troops was characteristic of the Russian Army. From the very beginning of the Russian regular army, Peter I began to build a system of troop supply based on the employment of supplies in permanent, temporary, and mobile magazines (stores). Even in that far removed time a firm course was taken toward the creation of mobile supply

battle development.

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in creating rear elements in each stage of troop organizational development.

For example, with the advent of combined-arms soyedineniya, a portion of the forces and systems was designated for the formation of just such a mobile echelon as the troop rear. We see exactly the same picture in the period when field armies and front ob'yedineniya were formed. In these developmental stages of troop organization there was a corresponding differentiation between rear echelons.

The appearance of such a highly maneuverable branch of armed forces as the air force created different conditions under which it was impossible to use the old method to achieve rear mobility that corresponded to the maneuverability of troops. Events forced a search for essentially new ways of solving this problem. An almost complete divorce of aviation chastl and soyedineniya from regular rear elements was required, as was the creation of an entire system of independent rear units capable of supporting any aviation maneuver according to the principle that "the support system is located with the supported troops."

At present the combat operations of large ob'yedineniya have become particularly dynamic and flexible. Their rear elements have been considerably lightened, but even in the present organization there are still opportunities for increasing mobility and maneuverability of the rear. I believe that a solution of the problem of mobility and maneuverability of the ground forces' rear support system should be sought along the lines tested in the practice of the Air Force. Of course, it is impossible to transfer practices of the Air Force rear support system in their entirety to the ground forces rear operations. However, in principle, the higher echelon of the rear must undertake the performance of the more labor-consuming tasks and relieve the supported troops of these functions. Only then is there hope of eliminating the factors which have a negative effect on the maneuver capabilities of ob'yedineniya.

In addition to organizational measures, an increase in mobility and maneuverability has always been facilitated by an improvement of technical equipment, mainly transportation equipment. New transport means, capable of satisfying to a large degree the maneuver requirements of troops and of performing the required volume of supply and evacuation transport, were employed for this purpose to achieve military objectives.

...sufficient grounds for establishing the principle of the constant growth in requirements for efficient leadership of the entire system of rear support

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In a number of the capitalist countries armies, this system continues to function at present. True, during World War II and the postwar period, rear staffs and commands also operated side by side in certain armies (US and FRG).

Requirements for operational control of the rear in the Soviet Army were sharply increased in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. Control of the rear at the outset of the war was so complicated that the execution of this task by combined-arms staffs interfered to a certain degree with their primary function of control of combat forces. It was also practically impossible to assign rear control functions to a single chief of the rear services.

In view of that situation, special elements of rear operational control -- rear staffs at the fronts and in armies (in sovedineniya there were organizational and planning sections) -- were created. The rear staffs played an extremely important role in the Great Patriotic War. Their tasks were flexible. The scope of tasks and functions of rear staffs was especially expanded by the advent of mass destruction weapons.

After studying the nature of modern operations and working conditions in rear areas during their preparation and conduct, we arrive at the conclusion that in the future it will be necessary to perfect all rear control elements to achieve an even greater increase in the effectiveness of their work.

This is also necessary because in the new conditions, the rear staffs are required not only to execute their traditional functions in overall organization of the rear, but also to assume service functions for the purpose of providing more efficient control of all rear sovedineniya, chasty, and agencies.

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tendencies which presently have a definite influence on ways of improving rear support principles and systems. The current revolution in the rear support of the armed forces creates the need to continue the study and implementation of an entire complex of measures for the further development and improvement of the rear services. It is extremely important that this work be accompanied by thorough and comprehensive research of all objective laws which determine the trend of each revolution. Only under these conditions will it be possible to exclude the influence of subjective factors and bureaucracy in determining the main course in the development of the rear as a single system of support of our armed forces.

FORWARD DETACHMENTS IN OFFENSIVE
OPERATIONS AND BATTLES

Approved For Release 2000/08/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300090014-1
by Col I. VOROB'YEV

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In the past, forward detachments were assigned to cooperate with the troops in developing an offensive. Their tasks consisted of a swift penetration into the depth of the defending troop formations, the capture of important objectives or positions which must be held until the arrival of main forces, and, in a number of instances, discovery of the strength and formation of enemy forces. Clearly these were support missions of a particular type; however, their successful execution achieved an activated offensive, an increased depth of influence on the defense, and in some measure its disorganization.

In the preatomic period, the theory and practice in the employment of forward detachments underwent a considerable evolution. Modern conditions require a more critical interpretation and revision of the problem. The purpose of this article is to present a brief review of this question.

The idea of employing forward detachments was conceived long before World War II. However, in practice they were rarely utilized in the initial stages. In both the Civil War and World War I, they operated only sporadically in a few offensive operations. It may be said that these were random attempts which did not receive widespread theoretical and practical recognition at that time.

During the 1930's at which time the theory of deep offensive operations was thoroughly examined and a rapid development of aviation, tanks, and artillery took place our theoretical thinking reached the obvious conclusion that it was necessary and purposeful to employ forward detachments.

Forward detachments were most widely used during the Great Patriotic War and especially after the Soviet Army switched to decisive offensive operations. In this case, the forward detachments (primarily tactical units) were employed in a relatively large number (one to two from each attacking division). In the concluding phase of the war, there was actually not one offensive operation which did not include numerous forward detachments of varied composition and purpose. For example, in the 1944 Crimean operation, 11 forward detachments were detailed from soyediniya of the 2d Guards Army first echelon alone. In the Lutsko-Roven-skaya and Mogilev offensive operations, the 13th and 49th Armies each had eight such detachments operating in their zones. Corps and even army forward detachments were detailed and participated in many operations in addition to the division forward detachments. For example, during the Manchurian offensive, there were three forward detachments in the 17th Army and seven in the 39th Army:

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There has already been some summarization of experience in the employment of forward detachments presented in this journal and I will only wish to point out that the practical experience convincingly demonstrated the increasing role of forward detachments. As the scope of offensive operations increased, the operations of forward detachments became more active and there was an expansion in the volume and purpose of their assigned missions. The more of these detachments were active in the Army or frontal attack sectors, the greater was the support they gave to the advancing main forces.

It was for this reason that during the past war the dispatch of forward elements became the rule and they rightfully assumed their place in combat and operational formations of advancing forces. There were clear tendencies to increase the number of detachments (especially tactical), their composition, and their mobility. However, finally the conclusion was reached that the most logical composition of forward detachments included reinforced tank podrazdeleniya, chasty, and soyedineniya, which had greater mobility and fire and striking power and consequently could achieve high operational results. It is sufficient to point out that such detachments frequently preceded the advancing division, corps, and army forces by 30 to 50 kilometers and were capable of executing the most varied combat and operational missions.

More decisive missions were assigned to operational forward detachments which had a substantial influence on the development of army and front offensive operations as a whole. By seizing important operational objectives and positions at a great depth, while on the march, they disrupted the enemy's system for operational troop control and the cooperation between the enemy troops and the rear, and they partially prevented the maneuvering of operational reserves.

The widespread employment of forward detachments in the last war is explained primarily by the increase in maneuver, fire, and strike capabilities of ground force podrazdeleniya, chasty, and soyedineniya, as well as the perfection of operational and tactical skill of our command cadres who understood that the more rapid, maneuverable, and dynamic the development of the offensive, the greater was the need to employ strong and mobile forward detachments and the more favorable were the chances of success in their missions.

Thus, widespread employment of forward detachments in offensive operations of the past war was a logical expression of the requirements of military art, which fully corresponded to the level of development of systems and techniques of warfare in the pre-atomic period.

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in connection with the equipment of armies with missiles and nuclear weapons and other new battle systems, the complete motorization and mechanization of the forward detachments, the increase in the ratio of tanks, all of which brought about drastic changes in the nature and techniques of training, and the conduct of combat and operations, there arises the question -- of what significance is a current study of experience in the employment of forward detachments in the last war and how should this problem be solved under present conditions?

First we will consider the question from the viewpoint of the forward detachments' assigned objective.

In the past, as we pointed out the forward detachments were primarily designated to execute tasks in seizing the most important tactical and operational objectives in the depth of the enemy's rear and holding them until the approach of the of the main forces, as well as discovering the formation and strength of the enemy.

Has this function of forward detachments now lost its significance? In my opinion, no; the performance of missions to seize profitable objectives and areas remains extremely important to success in an offensive even under present conditions. There is no need to prove the necessity for the timely capture of bridges across rivers, holding them until the arrival of friendly troops, or the seizure of a road junction, a mountain pass, or a defile in the course of a successfully developing offensive or pursuit. In addition to the fact that a swift penetration into the enemy's rear area even by small detachments will assist in containing the defender's maneuver, they will also hamper the enemy's employment of nuclear weapons, and in general will help to undermine the defense stability and to achieve a high tempo of advance by the attacking forces.

It is true that the execution of missions to seize objectives in the enemy's rear is no longer the monopoly of forward detachments. Airborne forces can also fulfill this role very successfully, but their landing (parachuting) can not be a very frequent occurrence and will be mostly limited to the most important sectors, moreover, the objectives of landing operations will usually be chosen at a relatively great depth in the enemy's rear. Direct support to the advancing groupings will, as before, be assigned to forward detachments.

Consequently, if we approach the forward detachments' role from this point of view, it would seem that there are no essential changes in their combat utilization. However, this is not the case. There is every reason to assume that under conditions of ever-growing maneuverability and dynamics of combat operations there will be an increase in the tactical and operational significance as well as in the ratio of operations by forward detachments. This is inevitable because, in modern battles and operations,

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the forward detachments will have to perform missions of seizing and holding important objectives, and the formation and strength of enemy forces by operating more decisively, at greater depth than before, and in a very complex situation.

It appears to me that the general purpose of this employment in battle and operations must now be viewed primarily as the ensuring of a more rapid and complete exploitation of nuclear strikes delivered by the advancing forces.

It is well known that in modern conditions there has developed a certain gap in time between the execution of nuclear strikes and the entry of advancing forces into the area. There is great reason for the fact that progressive military thought is searching for possibilities to reduce that gap to a minimum. As we have noted, it is impossible to completely solve that problem by employing only airborne forces. An entire complex of actions is required and one of them is the employment of forward detachments.

There may be objections that all advancing forces in the first echelon must strive for maximum exploitation of nuclear strike effects. That is true. But even so, comparatively small, highly mobile and maneuverable detachments, which have been assigned concrete tasks, may broadly utilize intervals and gaps in the defense and, without engaging in combat with enemy forces, can much more rapidly reach the designated objectives and support for operations of their main forces.

In addition to the above-cited tasks in seizing and holding areas and objectives, it seems to me that forward detachments may now successfully execute an entire series of other, for them essentially new, missions. One of their main tasks must be considered to be the destruction of the enemy's nuclear systems, especially the tactical systems. It is apparent that forward detachments could effectively destroy these systems. By rapidly penetrating into the depth, they may fairly inconspicuously and safely (because of the large "dead zone" of rockets) reach the immediate positional areas of rocket units (airfields for missile-bearing aircraft) and destroy or capture them. The detachments could be extremely effective against rocket units on the march while they change their positions. Execution of these tasks is facilitated by the fact that rocket launchers are very vulnerable to fire from artillery, tanks, and even rifle fire, as reported by the foreign press. Large forward detachments possessing their own nuclear weapons may be used not only to capture and hold objectives but also to destroy individual, small, advancing enemy reserve groupings, and to destroy his large control points and communication centers. This may be accomplished independently or in coordination with airborne forces and with support from nuclear weapons and aviation of a higher command. This, of course, does not mean that the

forward detachments will supplant the operations of first echelon units of the advancing troops. I believe that forward detachments have capabilities with those of the past and considering their expanded range of missions which, in a number of cases, may now exceed the scope of a supporting role.

I believe that forward detachments may be directed also at the destruction of individual enemy PVO groupings, in particular surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery complexes, control and guidance points, as well as fighter aircraft at airfield and especially those which employ nuclear weapons, including those for use against ground targets. Finally, the detachments may successfully destroy enemy rear objectives from the march, in particular the nuclear weapon stores and missile assembly bases.

The planned development of favorable conditions for effective nuclear weapon employment against enemy groupings must also be considered as a new mission for forward detachments. For example, by seizing crossings, road junctions, communications, and important positions, they may force the defending forces, their approaching reserves, and missile units to concentrate, thus creating a favorable target for nuclear strikes.

We see that there now exists a greater volume and variety of tasks to be assigned to forward detachments. In my opinion the greatest increase will be in the ratio of large forward detachments.

It seems to me that on the basis of previous war experience it would be reasonable to adopt the term "operational forward detachment."

At the same time the role of tactical detachments has not been decreased. In developing an offensive on a broad front, at a great depth, and in separate sectors, the operations of one or two large forward detachments do not eliminate the need for detailing a number of tactical detachments for the purpose of performing various tasks in support of the advancing sovedineniya. Moreover, as compared with the past, forward detachments may now be dispatched by separate tank and motorized rifle chasti and in a number of cases by separate groupings operating along different axes.

Thus it may be assumed that under modern conditions the overall number of forward detachments will be increased. It is believed that they will be employed simultaneously or consecutively, but with various targets, tasks, and along various axes of the troop offensive.

The armament and technical equipment of troops is now such that practically any combat ready motorized rifle or tank sovedineniye, chasti, or podrazdeleniye may always be employed as a forward detachment without

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special training. Therefore, there are now none of the difficulties which were encountered in the composition of forward detachments. True, in the final period of the war, as we stated before, they frequently included tank and mechanized chasti and soyedineniya. However, as a rule, these were few and therefore it frequently occurred that the forward detachments (especially those in combined-arms ob'yedineniya and rifle soyedineniya) represented a composite group of rifle, artillery, and other podrazdeleniya which had to be provided with motor transport. Much time was spent in training such detachments.

The type of troops (tank or motorized rifle) most favorably employed in forward detachments depends on their missions and concrete requirements of the situation. If, during the offensive, it is necessary to cross a series of large water obstacles or cross over expansive areas of difficult terrain, it is more expedient to detail motorized rifle chasti reinforced by tanks. Forward detachments of tanks possessing great striking force, are more effective in destroying the enemy and more decisive in seizing and holding his objectives.

In determining the composition of forward detachments of chasti and podrazdeleniya, which are equal in mobility and maneuverability to the main forces, there may be some doubt whether the forward detachment can break away from the main grouping and fulfill its mission. I note that this circumstance is sometimes cited as a primary argument which supposedly proves that forward detachments have now become obsolete and lost their role in modern dynamic operations.

But if we turn once again to the experience of the last war, we are easily convinced that even then the dispatch of forward detachments was dictated not so much by the various degrees of mobility of chasti and soyedineniya (although this played a certain role), as by the desire to increase the speed of advance and to increase the depth of simultaneous action against the defender along important axes, primarily there where the most favorable situation was developing.

There is no doubt that the more mobile the forward detachments, the more opportunities they will have for successful operations. This has been fully confirmed by the practice of employing forward detachments in rifle divisions, rifle corps, and combined-arms armies during the last war. However, the possibility and expediency of employing forward detachments is in no way lessened if they are equal in mobility to the main forces of advancing troops. To confirm this fact, I cite the experience of tank, mechanized, and cavalry corps and tank armies. All their troops had almost equal mobility, nevertheless they dispatched and operated forward detachments which more often than not were successful in performing the assigned missions.

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How was this achieved? Firstly, the detachments could rapidly break forward choosing favorable axes for their actions; secondly, such break-away actions were given special support, as the detachments were pushed forward by destroying the counteracting enemy units with long-range artillery fire and strikes by support aviation, especially attack aviation. To a large degree this was also made possible by the circumstance that the offensive was being waged methodically and according to plan. The main forces advanced in a continuous unbroken front.

Also of great significance was the skill of the forward detachment commanders in finding the most effective methods for rapid penetration into the enemy's depth of defense, by passing his strong points and resistance centers and swiftly reaching and seizing the designated objectives. The forward detachments usually did not become tied up in extended battles with the enemy, but exploited the intervals and gaps in his combat formations through extensive use of bypass maneuvers.

In modern battles and operations, there are even more favorable objective prerequisites and factors for a swift break-away of forward detachments from the main forces and the successful execution of their missions.

Firstly, when, the troops of both sides are operating on separate axes rather than on a solid front (as before), there inevitably will be large intervals in the combat and operational formation of defending troops, in the absence of continuous defensive positions and zones, and there will be a considerable dispersion of chast and soyedineniya in both frontage and depth which will be favorable for the forward detachments.

Secondly, the employment of nuclear weapons permits a rapid and decisive break-up of any defense and the creation of large breaches and intervals through which forward detachments may rapidly penetrate to a great depth by exploiting the results of nuclear strikes.

I would like to draw attention to the fact that it is now possible to dispatch forward detachments immediately after a nuclear strike against the enemy in the very initial stages of operation and battle, even prior to commencing the offensive with first echelon forces; whereas in the last war they operated, as a rule, during the course of a break-through the tactical defense by attacking troops and in the operational depth. They were not dispatched before this time because the main defense zone was usually strongly fortified and solidly occupied by enemy troops and fire systems.

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Nuclear weapons have created favorable conditions for all advancing troops, including forward detachments, for operating at high speeds and for decisive execution of deeper and more complex missions than before. In the past, when forward detachments, which had broken away from the main forces, encountered strong points and resistance centers in their path they were forced to bypass them, which delayed the speed of advance; in a number of cases they were required to dig in at the positions reached and to hold them until the arrival of the main forces. Now, the enemy may be hit by missile and aircraft strikes, both nuclear and conventional, in support of forward detachments and at the request of their commanders. This action provides even better chances for the success of forward detachment operations. At the same time, the availability of more perfected artillery and tanks in the forward detachments increases their capability to execute missions in a decisive manner.

Certainly, it is still required that the forward detachment have high mobility and maneuverability (this must be considered when they are detached), but it is no less important to see that they have as much fire power and striking force as possible. In this regard it seems to me that it would be expedient in a number of cases to attach podrazdeleniya of tactical missiles to large detachments designated to perform such missions as the destruction of nuclear attack systems or large control points, or the routing of enemy reserves. This would undoubtedly increase their combat capability and independence.

In as much as the need for forward detachments, as cited above, has considerably grown, they may frequently be a permanent element in the combat formation of advancing groupings.

It appears to me that because of the continuity and high pace of a modern offensive we can no longer limit ourselves to retaining the same forward detachments throughout the whole battle or operation, as was done before. They have to make repeated break-aways from the troops (after the performance of successive mission), which presents certain difficulties. Therefore it is obvious that it is now necessary to rotate forward detachments by replacing them with newly designated detachments.

It must be assumed that the nature of operations by forward detachments may change considerably as compared to the past. For example, in addition to the usual operations of seizing and holding important objectives and positions in the rear of the defending army until arrival of the advancing forces, they may also employ other operational techniques, including so-called raiding operations. Basically, these operations consist of assigning to each detachment not just one but several objectives, located at various depths. Such tasks should be assigned in consideration of each detachment's capabilities. Such raids may be especially effective when performed by large detachments. It should be noted that similar operations were employed in some cases during the Great Patriotic War.

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RIGHT For example, in the Manchurian offensive from the 6th Tank Army conducted relatively extended raiding operations, breaking away from the main forces by 60 to 80 kilometers and more. However, at that time these were exceptions and tactical forward detachments did not conduct such operations.

Under modern conditions it appears that any forward detachments could operate in this manner, exploiting the results of nuclear strikes and cooperating with airborne forces.

By exploiting nuclear weapon and air strike results, the forward detachments are now more capable than before of wide maneuvering and swift advance, without engaging in extended battles with the defender. In addition, when nuclear weapons are employed there is an opportunity to act more frequently by advancing to the designated objective along the shortest route with the aim of seizing it rapidly. The availability of forward detachments facilitates a great dispersion of advancing forces in depth.

I would like to direct attention to the fact that considerable difficulties may also be encountered in forward detachment operations. As distinguished from the past, these detachments may be subjected to nuclear attacks by the defenders and they may encounter "nuclear barriers," zones of destruction, and radioactive contamination of terrain along their path. Therefore, they must now frequently execute missions in very complex situations. This particularly applies to their actions in meeting engagements when each side will strive to seize and hold the initiative and achieve its goals by a decisive offensive following nuclear strikes.

It might be assumed that, in conducting a meeting engagement after the forces have deployed from the march, there is no need to detail forward detachments, at least until the enemy has ceased offensive operations. In my opinion, such an assumption is unfounded, as forward detachment operations in such conditions will only facilitate the achievement of success. Moreover, the existence of advance units (avangardy) sent on a march in anticipation of a meeting engagement does not preclude the necessity of dispatching forward detachments, since their aims and operational techniques are very different. In particular, the advance units, as an element of march security, have a basic mission, i.e., to warn and in some measure to protect the main forces against a surprise enemy attack, and to prevent enemy reconnaissance penetration. Therefore, upon meeting with enemy security units they attempt to destroy or contain them. Forward detachments, on the other hand, must evade combat through maneuver and, as rapidly as possible, reach their designated objectives to destroy or capture them. Of course, both advance units and forward detachments must always coordinate their operations.

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Attachments must be equipped with radiation and engineering reconnaissance devices and engineering equipment which permits a rapid clearing of crossings, etc., but without overloading them so that mobility will be reduced.

Forward detachments must cross river lines independently or in cooperation with airborne forces. Operations should not be limited to seizure and holding of crossings and bridgeheads, as it was done during the past war, because the enemy can deliver nuclear strikes and destroy the detachment. Therefore, if the situation permits, it is necessary that only a portion of the forces be left behind to hold the captured bridgehead or crossing and the main body of the detachment must rapidly penetrate as deeply as possible. If the forward detachment links up with an airborne force they must join their efforts to operate even more decisively, including the delivery of surprise attacks against the enemy with the aim of destroying him on the opposite bank. Sometimes, the forward detachment will have to cooperate with an amphibious landing force when the offensive is conducted in a coastal sector.

In the past war, there was hardly any need to concern oneself with cooperation between forward detachments and airborne or amphibious landing forces. Now that necessity will frequently arise. In determining the procedure for cooperation between landing forces and detachments, there must be an attempt to see that their actions are always coordinated as to missions, time, and place, and coordinated with nuclear strikes against the enemy.

In regard to cooperation between forward detachments and reinforces, it should be organized in such a way that the necessary assistance with nuclear weapons, supporting aviation, and by the advancing forces themselves may be given to each forward detachment. I want to especially emphasize the role of aviation which, just as in the past, is the most important and frequently the only means capable of supporting forward detachments. Aviation is called upon to conduct reconnaissance to discover the nature of defense of the objectives to be seized, to carry out strikes against advancing reserves of the defender and his nuclear systems which might be used against the forward detachments, as well as to cover the detachments from the air. To maintain uninterrupted cooperation with aviation, it is desirable that the forward detachment commander have the constant services of an air force representative equipped with communication means.

The successful performance of missions by forward detachments depends to a great degree upon thorough and comprehensive support of their operations. Primary attention is devoted to organization of reconnaissance with the aim of discovering those nuclear attack systems and enemy

purpose of discovering zones of radioactive contamination. At the same time the nature of the objectives designated for capture, the intervals in the defender's combat formation, the intervals along the routes of the detachments' operations, must be determined ahead of time. Reconnaissance data must be transmitted promptly to the commanders of forward detachments; thus appropriate communications facilities are necessary, including direct communications with reconnaissance aircraft. The forward detachments themselves must be used as one of the sources for obtaining reconnaissance data on the enemy and terrain along their axis of operation.

Forward detachments require reliable cover against enemy air strikes. This is because they are operating at a distance from the main forces and therefore, as a rule, are outside the PVO zone created by air defense systems of the advancing forces' main grouping. In this regard it appears that the detachments must possess their own forces and systems both for reconnoitering an aerial enemy and for repelling his attack at both low and medium altitudes. Cover for the detachment by fighter aircraft will be provided according to plan of the higher echelons.

There is a complex problem in the organization and implementation of control over forward detachments, especially if several detachments are operating at the same time. Consideration must be given to the fact that the commander can not personally observe their actions and that control must be effected through use of a map. The relatively great distance to the forward detachments and the possibility of frequent and drastic changes in the situation in the sector of their operations certainly requires that uninterrupted and reliable communications with them be maintained. Clearly, the best variant would be the organization of communications with each detachment on radio channels. Mobile communications systems, primarily aircraft and helicopters, may also be widely employed.

In conclusion, I may note that unceasing military technological progress and the ever increasing complexity in the nature of offensive operations are creating the need for further theoretical study of problems on the employment and operations of forward detachments, as well as for systematic, practical tests conducted during combat training.

Notes

1. Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945 (History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945), Voenizdat, Vol. 6, page 577.
2. Voyennaya Mysl', No 6, 1963.

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by Chief Mar Armd Trps P. ROTMISTROV

Perfection of the methodological skill of professors and instructors in higher military educational institutions is a most important factor in the qualitative improvement of the students' training.

The professors and instructors have a great responsibility in training and indoctrinating officer cadres. Therefore, an instructor must thoroughly study Marxism-Leninism and its methodology. He must be well-versed in his subject, taking account of all that is new as a result of rapid developments in science and technology, and in addition he must master to perfection the methodology for training and indoctrination, be capable of presenting the subject matter to the trainees in accessible form, and know how to express his thoughts clearly, logically, and convincingly. It is very important that the instructor have constant contact with the trainees, be well acquainted with each student and know how to give him timely assistance. In all his actions an instructor must be a model for his students.

Increased demands for methodological training for instructors are also presented by the introduction into the training process of such new technical means as television, motion pictures, sound recorders, amplifiers, desk calculators, and various simulators and electrified devices. The instructor must have a knowledge of these systems and be skillful in using them in training work at a high methodological level.

It is no less important that the instructors possess knowledge and skills which would enable them to instruct students successfully in the methods of rapid decision-making, clear transmission of verbal orders in command language, as well as instilling habits in demonstrating wise initiative and boldness in decision making. In training practice, it is necessary that more consideration be given to experience in combat and operational troop training.

Student instruction in higher military educational institutions is conducted in accordance with approved plans and programs developed on the basis of CPSU Central Committee instructions and those of the Soviet Government, as well as requirements in orders and directives from the Minister of Defense. Consequently, the question of what to teach the student is clear. However, answers to questions as to how to teach and how to relate training and indoctrination so as to achieve a maximum effect demand daily and detailed work by the staffs of supervisors instructors and professors, and by the Party and Komsomol

organizations at the higher military educational institutions. Without doubt, the main role in this matter belongs to the professors and instructors.

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In recent years, the higher military educational institutions have conducted great work in increasing the knowledge and skill of the instructors. There has been refresher training for some of the instructors in a number of new specialties. However, at the same time we have done far from everything to fulfill the directive of the Minister of Defense for a decisive improvement in the personal training of instructors and perfection of their methodological skill.

In this article, I will dwell on several problems in the training of instructor staffs and the improvement of methods for training students, particularly in regard to operational art and tactics.

Minister of Defense, Mar SU, R. Ya. MALINOVSKIY spoke at the Military Academy imeni Frunze in December 1962 on problems in training military cadres which would meet modern warfare requirements; he dwelt in detail on the necessity to instill in the students, during the process of training, high field qualities, and the skill to make rapid and sufficiently sound decisions in an operation or battle. He used a number of convincing examples to show the harmful results of slow action and indecision of a commander in a combat situation. In modern conditions, decisions on combat actions cannot be made after extended collective debate. Although rarely, we unfortunately do encounter such facts. Under present conditions, when the entire situation can change quickly, and when decision-making time must be measured in minutes, there can be no question of such methods of decision-making. However, to avoid such a situation and keep the commander from becoming a mere approving official rather than a decision maker, he must receive appropriate training. There is no sense in hiding the fact that in higher military educational institutions we do not always train commanders so that they make sound decisions on their own in short periods, on the basis of an existing situation.

An increase in knowledge and perfection of skills of the professors and instructors may be accomplished in the commanders' training system. In its course, the instructors study the theory of military art and broaden their technical knowledge. Classes are also conducted in carrying out operational and tactical missions and emergency problems. In this regard, general approval must be given to the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze and the Military Academy of Armored Troops for their initiative. At these academies, the professors and instructors periodically take part in solving the most important problems at operational and tactical meetings. As a result of these, each instructor is given a rating, followed by a qualified critique.

It is impossible to consider the situation normal when the train-
ing of instructors is conducted without the receipt of instructions or
instructions prior to his conducting training classes with students.
In those higher military schools where that method of training for
instructors is predominant, there should be an immediate reorganization
and a course should be set toward increasing the operational and
tactical preparation of professors and instructors.

Important measures in this plan are the military games and
command-staff exercises held for instructors. These games and exer-
cises result in perfecting such important commander qualities as rapid
estimation of the situation quick decision-making, and assignment of
concise and clear missions to the troops.

In order to develop such qualities, there must be a decisive end
to such occurrences when certain instructors, instead of giving short,
laconic reports on their decision, begin by a lecture-style outline of
the problem's theory, then expansively give the background for their
decision, and only then formulate the decision, as it was done at one
of the academies.

One of the forms for improving the methodological skill of instruc-
tors are the training-methods conferences which are, as a rule, conducted
in the higher military schools prior to the beginning of the school year.
At these conferences, more attention should be devoted to practice
sessions in solving problems and they should not be limited to lectures
and discussions of separate methodological problems. Classes conducted
during training conferences must serve as a preparation and example for
subsequent classes with students.

Practice shows that training goals and tasks of the conferences
are more fully accomplished when they are conducted after the preceding
year's training results for troops and staffs have been announced,
when the tasks for the coming training year have been defined. In this
regard, the necessity for revising the dates for holding training-
methods conferences of instructors has become urgent.

Systematic participation by instructors in troop and command-staff
exercises is of great assistance in bringing the students' training
closer to the real-life troop requirements. Experience has shown that
such participation is of considerably greater value when the instructors
perform concrete functional duties in such exercises and thus receive
direct practice in troop control.

There should be more practice in the exchange of methodological
experience, both within a school and among higher military schools, by
means of joint attendance of lectures, practice sessions, various types
of conferences, and popularization of the best methodological experience
in the periodic press.

Established methods of study in operational and tactical disciplines in higher military schools have proven themselves and there are no changes. However, the development of the theory of military art and the introduction of qualitatively new equipment in the Army and Navy require further perfection in methods of training students, and consequently, in increasing the knowledge and methodological skill of instructors.

The study of any portion of each operational and tactical discipline begins with mastery of the theoretical premises, by listening to lectures and by independent study of literature and participation in seminar studies. Then the students' knowledge is deepened and reinforced by practical training sessions conducted in classrooms and in the field in the form of solving various tasks.

Because of the special methods in the instruction of operational and tactical disciplines and their constantly changing content, instructors in those disciplines must constantly renew their knowledge regardless of their experience and seniority. In the process of commander's training, they follow approximately the same path on which they will subsequently lead their students; they listen to lectures and work out the most important problems in practical training.

I will present specific methodological problems in training instructors in more detail.

On Lectures. In training highly qualified officer cadres, the theoretical course has great importance. Practice shows that when it is correctly set up in the higher military school and when conditions are established for consolidating theoretical knowledge by interesting and well thought-out practical training (in laboratories, in the field, at training areas, during exercises with the troops, and in OJT with the troops) the officers upon completion of the higher school will go to the troops fully capable of independently and thoroughly understanding the theory and practice of military arts.

Lectures are the most important part of a theoretical course. From the lectures, the students learn all that is new as related to the studied discipline; the subject matter is disclosed to them; attention is fixed on the main points; the essence of the basic concepts, their theories, and formulas are clarified, and the applied significance of the studied subject to the military is disclosed.

A lecture should have ideological Marxist-Leninist direction and its content should correspond to the contemporary level of scientific and technical development. Only reliable data and conclusions, and theoretical premises closely related to practice and prospective development in the given field of science are presented in lectures. It is

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important that the lecture be more than a simple condensation of the textbook. Overloading the lecture with secondary information reduces its quality. The presentation should be made in a definite logical sequence so that the students do not remember mechanically but do thoroughly understand the content of the material presented. All facts and examples, diagrams and sketches, blueprints and demonstration experiments are auxiliary means for revealing the basic theoretical content of a lecture.

In discussing theoretical questions related to arms and equipment the instructor orients the trainees in the very latest weapons but does not underestimate military equipment which has to a certain degree become obsolete but which has not yet lost its significance. Therefore, the lecture's theoretical premises and conclusions must disclose the combat qualities of weapons and the most favorable methods and techniques of their employment.

In preparing a lecture, the instructor considers the complexity of the studied material for a given group of students their degree of training, and the availability and nature of textbooks and material-technical support materials.

In the higher military schools there are many good, experimental methods experts, who can interest the students and thoroughly explain the subject matter. I would like to cite instructor D. M. PROEKTOR of the Academy imeni Frunze. His lectures are outstanding in clarity and conciseness of presentation, they thoroughly expose the subject essence, and as a rule, contain new materials, which supplement the textbooks on basic problems of the subject matter.

Unfortunately, not all lectures given in the higher military schools answer the requirements; some of them are too vague and have an excess of truisms. Sometimes, from the content of the lecture, it is difficult to determine which military chair it represents. Not all instructors consider the methodological peculiarities of teaching various courses. Frequently, lectures given to junior courses are given in the same manner as for the senior courses.

There are instances when a lecturer concentrates his main attention on elementary questions and consciously evades an all-around argumentation of the complicated premises of a subject. For example, Col N. F. MIROSHNICHENKO at the Academy imeni M. V. Frunze, who in general delivered his lecture well, for some reason omitted the main questions related to the commander's activity in modern combat.

I have already cited the importance of skillful employment of visual aids in training methods. However, this well-known truth is not always applied. The lecture of Engr Col D. I. SUPRUN (Academy

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a specialized classroom, which was fully equipped with panels and mock-ups, he at no time referred to them although this was obviously necessary. It should be noted that the academy has produced good training films; there are excellent electrified panels and many other visual aids, but they are rarely used.

A resolution of the council of the Chemical Defense Academy also pointed out the inadequate employment of visual aids and such technical training aids as films, which combine many elements of the training process, books, drawings, live speech, and experimental demonstration.

The supervisors, professors and instructors have the task of systematically analyzing and summarizing the positive experience in the work of the best instructors and lecturers. On this basis, they should radically improve the methodology and quality of lectures in higher military schools.

On Practical Training. Knowledge gained from a theoretical course is reinforced by various practical training. Its basic forms in operational-tactical disciplines are group exercises, short briefings, command and staff games, and exercises. Practical training has a definite goal of broadening and reinforcing knowledge of theory in a certain subject and instilling will power qualities in students, as well as resourcefulness and skill to quickly arrive at a correct independent decision and achieve firm control of troops.

It is recommended that training along these lines be conducted with the professors and instructors. One of the most effective forms is found in the short briefings in which the instructors must train their skill in giving orders, prevent extended discussions, and after a short study of the subject's content proceed to the decision and the issuance of an order.

From the methodological point of view, these briefings are valuable in that they permit training in decision-making in a complex situation when time is measured in minutes. For example, briefings may indicate sharp changes in the situation during an offensive battle and operation, when an enemy counterattack or counterstrike is being repelled, as well as during a meeting engagement; this requires the trainee to make new decisions for immediate destruction of enemy nuclear missile systems, or for execution of a decisive strike on his rapidly moving column, etc. The Minister of Defense has repeatedly called attention to the fact that students should acquire habits of wise initiative in decision-making. To develop initiative in students, they must be placed in a situation where they are forced to use initiative in reaching independent decisions, but within the meaning of the task assigned by the senior chief. Such practical training must be thoroughly prepared from

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the course of a briefing the senior chief assigns a definite mission to subordinate troops for executing a deep strike against the "enemy" and then in the same exercise the subordinates are forced to display initiative in shifting to the defense. There is little value in such exercises and such initiative. The training must be so designed that a commander who has lost communications with his senior chief could make a decision at his own risk but in keeping with the senior chief's intentions.

In the process of training instructors, it is necessary to devote more attention to their ability to issue concise directives, to train the instructors of operational and tactical faculties in the rapid issuance of verbal orders and directives, to teach them to write brief notes and to make rapid estimates. For this purpose it is useful to conduct training in march movements and meeting engagements in which the situation changes abruptly and rapid decisions are required from the commander. Naturally, when conducting training on a given subject the trainees must be faced with such conditions that will permit the demonstration of different ways to organize a march in various situations.

Both types of march, i.e. an extended march where there is little possibility of meeting the enemy and a march in anticipation of a meeting engagement, have much in common; however, the difference in organization of these marches is often great and this must be considered in conducting the training.

If the march is to be made over several hundred kilometers and without threat of a clash with the enemy, the commander must plan so that the march is conducted in secrecy, in a short period, and with maximum conservation of human strength and equipment. In organizing a march which anticipates an engagement with a ground enemy, the commander must first of all plan for ensuring constant combat readiness and rapid deployment of forces for conducting the battle.

From what has been stated, it is clear that the best methodological technique for conducting instructive training may be considered one which requires that training be conducted strictly within the scope of the assigned training goal, and without diffusing attention on the solution of numerous problems. It is important that the trainees efficiently master the assigned missions and also clearly understand their errors which would be intolerable in an actual situation. It is necessary that the training supervisor carefully plan all courses of decision, the dynamics of the battle, and that he himself clearly understand what he wishes to teach the trainees.

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tional and tactical training for instructors, it is my opinion that group exercises should be conducted only in special cases. For acquisition of skills in organization of command and staff operations, it is very important to follow a practice of conducting command and staff exercises and war games with instructors, which should include the greatest possible number of instructors from the operational and tactical faculties.

On Unity of Views. An army can not be strong without a unity of views, without unity in concept of military doctrine established by the state, and without well-trained officer cadres. Therefore, much attention is devoted to developing a unity of opinions on basic problems in theory and practice of military subjects in the higher military schools where highly qualified officers are trained.

The instructor usually has a group of 12-15 men in group training sessions in the classroom or in the field. Consequently, even with the most thorough methodological preparation of instructors, their individual qualities will always assert themselves.

The best form for developing a unity of opinions for conduct of a battle and operations is a lecture which is usually attended by all students of a course and sometimes from several courses of related faculties. When outlining the principles for employment of modern combat equipment, methods, and battle techniques, there should be no fear that such methodology may lead to a routine approach. In my opinion, the academies must present theoretical knowledge on all questions of modern military art and reinforce that knowledge within the scope of tactics and operational art by the proper practical training. A well-prepared commander, who knows combat and operational principles will always make a wise decision based on the current situation. On the other hand, insufficiently trained commanders who do not have firm knowledge on organizational fundamentals and the conduct of battle and are also indecisive will probably interpret the senior chief's requirements in different ways, and in a combat situation this will lead to loss of initiative and defeat in battle.

During the Great Patriotic War, one often heard the opinion that the German tactics were stereotyped and that this was a great minus in their troop training. It is true that the Germans held to a pattern in combat operations but one should not confuse the two concepts - unity of views and patterns. It was because of the unity of views in the area of tactics that the Germans achieved definite military success in both World War I and II. The unity of views in the German Army was demonstrated in the well planned coordination of units and subunits as well as of the various services on the field of battle. The German

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Especially developed the cooperation of tanks and aviation and the cooperation of advancing troops with the engineer troops while crossing a river. These are problems which should not be neglected in training our officer cadres.

It is appropriate to note here that the Germans made some very crude errors in operational and strategic estimates. In World Wars I and II, they held fast to a strictly offensive doctrine and in both cases they lost the war. On the other hand the French, in 1940, held to a defensive doctrine and also failed to achieve success.

Our Soviet military doctrine was and remains offensive, but we have never negated the probability of defensive operations. Our military doctrine turned out to be the more flexible and realistic one in the past war.

All of these questions require deep scientific research and in this area primacy belongs to the military academies and to their professors and instructors. Incidentally, in emphasizing the importance of unity of views, I am far from belittling the value of a creative approach. However, creativity is useful after a man has already acquired the requisite knowledge on the fundamentals of military art in theory and in practice.

The experience of the past war demonstrated that only when there was a complete unity of views between chiefs and subordinates was it possible to issue concise directions and understand each other even from incomplete sentences. That is why it is important to avoid confusing the concepts of "unity of views" and "stereotype". If subordinates are trained in the spirit of stereotype, it will be impossible to expect an all-around display of initiative; however, when there is a unity of views there is also widespread initiative. Development of initiative also requires faith in your chief and expectation that he will not reprimand you for displaying initiative. Unfortunately, certain senior chiefs do not always react properly to subordinates' displays of initiative and view such actions as willfulness.

Instructors are obligated to develop the all-around initiative of their students; to inspire them so that they will never make half-baked decisions or change decisions during a battle unless there is an extreme emergency, and so that they would know that even an average decision which is skillfully and resolutely, executed will lead more quickly to a victory than a better but delayed decision. It must always be emphasized that it is impossible to be strong in all areas. Therefore, it is necessary to be strong on the axis that is dangerous to the enemy, i.e. where our victory will have noticeable results or, in other words, where it will have the greatest effect.

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Priority in forces may be created by knowing how to widely employ maneuver. With modern mobility of forces and the long range of missiles, maneuver acquires greater significance than before. Therefore, skill in maneuvering forces and systems must be thoroughly taught to future commanders.

On Military-Scientific Work. The prominent military theoretician, M. V. FRUNZE, in an article on academicians and academies, referred to the question of military scientific work among students; without denying its value, he warned that military scientific work must have definite limits. When its scope exceeds such boundaries, there is a danger that the effect may be negative. Confidence in one's own strength is fine, M. V. FRUNZE noted, especially when it is based on a firm foundation of knowledge and experience. When this does not exist, such military scientific work threatens to become self-conceit and unfounded self-sufficiency. The fact of admitting to being a student does not exclude the possibility for initiative but there is no need to tolerate boastful self-reliance.

Unfortunately, this type of attitude to military scientific work is now observed frequently in our higher military schools.

For example, one of the chiefs of our military academies formulated requirements for first course students in military scientific work thus: "At times, you may hear that scientific work is a voluntary effort, that the student arrived at the academy primarily to acquire knowledge, and in our academy the majority of students begin active work in a military-scientific society and in design bureaus only in their senior years. This is unforgivable, the solution of scientific problems is often within the capabilities even of first-year students. That is why the party organizations of faculties, courses, and chairs must, from the students' first days at the academy, see to it that senior-course experience in both organization of study and in military scientific work is transmitted to new students."

There is no need to comment on such recommendations, since they are obviously not justified. I will only note that scientific work differs from innovation work in that he who engages in science must have good theoretical knowledge of the general scientific disciplines and at least elementary skills in conducting scientific research. This knowledge and these skills are usually acquired by the students in the engineering faculties toward the end of the third year. In the command faculties a student acquires mature thinking habits and the capability to analyze the material he reads usually not earlier than the second year.

do not have the requisite knowledge and do not understand that this work is not to be confused with innovation work. There should be a firm foundation of scientific knowledge there is no need to draw them into military scientific work. This would bring nothing but harm. Even without such work, the academic programs consume very much time.

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On the Instructor's Authority. The instructor brings the live word to the students, discloses the secrets of science to them, enriches their knowledge, instills in them the high qualities of a communist builder and defender of the Motherland, and no matter what technical systems are used to train students, the instructor remains the central figure in the training process. His unwavering authority must be universally preserved and maintained.

It cannot be considered correct when the students at some of the higher military schools criticize the lectures heard, or the conduct of group exercises and seminars, while they lack sufficient knowledge of the matter. Of course, an instructor may sometimes read a lecture poorly or conduct an exercise which deserves criticism, but the appropriate chiefs, and not the students, must correct the instructors. It must be remembered that the chair has to answer for all mistakes of an instructor. Usually, the chiefs of courses, representatives of the training department chiefs of faculties, and other responsible officials attend the lectures and classes in accordance with a control plan approved by the chief of the academy. They are called upon to rate the content and quality of instruction. Incidentally, the most frequent criticism of instructors is heard at the meetings of junior-course students, who personally lack any deep knowledge and encounter difficulties in mastering the training program, therefore they search for ways to blame anyone except themselves. It is even worse when individual instructors ask the students' opinion and rating of their lecture, at the end of a lecture.

Of course, any student may have his opinion, express his views, and consult with the party organization on problems which may have arisen. However, this can only be done when he has thoroughly studied the subject in accordance with the academic program. At the Military Academy of the General Staff, in 1957, one of the students, instead of applying all efforts to mastering the very complex program and demonstrating a desire to accept the best from the persons teaching him, chose a different path. When attending classes, he did not strive to gain deep understanding of all the new problems and increase his knowledge, but rather sought to build up material for critical comments. He sharply criticized the instruction methods, the content of lectures, the men who taught him, and wrote critical articles in various journals

was well-founded enough to find the support of the scientific-
pedagogical staff of the academy as well as of the General Staff

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In the final outcome, after completion of the academy, he did receive a high position, but soon showed his complete inadequacies and was relieved from that position.

* * *

The higher military schools, employ many instructors who conduct all types of training classes at a highly scientific and methodological level. However, the interests of raising the quality of military cadre training require that the knowledge and methodological skills of instructors undergo constant improvement. Experience gained by the best methods experts must become accessible to all the numerous instructors and first of all to young instructors.

Important factors in the perfection of methodological skill are the utilization of various forms, efficient and scientific planning of methodological work, and a systematic increase of the instructors' knowledge and skills.

Generals and officers who are assigned to instructors' duties in military academies and higher schools from the troops have certain skills in the methodology of organizing and conducting studies; however, that is not enough for instructors in higher military schools. Organization and conduct of classes with students in the higher military schools have their peculiar features which must be considered. Each class, whether it is a lecture, seminar, group exercise, or laboratory work, must serve as an example of high methodological skill and excellent organization of instruction. To provide high methodological training for students is the most important duty of instructors in academies and higher schools. The future commander, political worker, and engineer must be able to correctly and clearly transmit his knowledge to his subordinates. He must be able to demonstrate how to conduct tactical exercises and war games, in an instructive manner, how to execute complex exercises with the use of combat equipment and weapons. All of this must be learned by the students in the higher schools on the basis of the best experience of instructors.

That is why the unceasing perfection in methodology and organization in conducting all types of classes in operational and tactical disciplines is a task of prime importance for all professors and instructors of higher military schools. The successful solution of this task will raise the quality of military cadre training to a new and higher level.

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...it is necessary to emphasize that in the higher military schools the students must acquire deep theoretical and practical knowledge on the basis of a close unity of theory and practice in the learning process. It must be remembered that the study of military theory and history will considerably broaden the scope of military knowledge of a student considerably more than his own, usually limited combat experience. In view of the fact that military academies now have very few students who participated in the past war, the students must be required to study the recommended literature conscientiously and to give close attention to the material which they receive from instructors. The voluminous military, scientific-technical, and other literature which is found in our academic libraries is recommended to the students to give them the necessary basic data and to prepare well-grounded and cultured commanders for our Armed Forces.

by Col V. Konyukhovskiy

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After Marx and Engels, Lenin most fully and consistently applied the fundamental premises of Marxist theory to military affairs. He creatively developed and enriched the views of Marxism on the problems of war, the army, and military science as applied to the new historical epoch of imperialism.

V. I. Lenin's interest in problems of military theory and practice was natural and logical. As the founder and leader of a truly Marxist militant party of a new type which had assumed the historical task of the revolutionary transformation of society, Lenin had to evaluate the great significance of armed conflict. In the most thorough manner he studied military problems and taught the Party that under conditions of a critical aggravation of imperialist conflicts, the working class could not achieve its liberation without establishing its own military organization and without acquiring military knowledge.

In an article "The Revolutionary Army and Revolutionary Government," Lenin wrote, "Look at military affairs. Not a single Social Democrat, who was in the slightest familiar with history and who studied under the great scholar of that art, Engels, could ever doubt the tremendous significance of military knowledge or the tremendous importance of military technology and military organization as a tool to be used by the people's masses and people's classes to resolve the great historical clashes" (Complete Collected Works, Vol. 10, p. 340).

V. I. Lenin was not only a brilliant thinker and revolutionary, the creator and leader of the Party, and the founder of the Soviet state, but also a great military leader. He was directly in charge of the Party's military and combat operations until October and established the Soviet Armed Forces after the victory of the socialist revolution; he inspired and organized their glorious victories over the united forces of foreign military intervention and internal counter-revolution. Lenin built the foundations of Soviet military science.

In the first years after the revolution and the Civil War, the role of V. I. Lenin as a military leader was correctly interpreted in our military and political literature. It is sufficient to note the articles by M. V. Frunze "Lenin and the Red Army," On the Anniversary of the Leader's Death, "The Red Army Fulfills Lenin's Behests," and others, which contained an objective evaluation of V. I. Lenin's

tremendous contribution to the development of the Soviet Armed Forces, to his leadership of their combat operations, and to the development of proletarian military science.

M. V. Frunze wrote that V. I. Lenin's activities clearly demonstrated the greatest qualities of the leader of the proletarian revolution, "a leader not only in the purely political sphere, but also in the type of politics which are a transition to armed conflict, to revolt, and later to civil war. In this area, Lenin established himself as a brilliant strategist and tactician." (1)

V. I. Lenin's military leadership was also widely publicized in numerous works by active participants in the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Civil War, which were published in the 1920's. However, later under the influence of the Stalin personality cult, our political and military theoretical literature, began to suppress and distort V. I. Lenin's role as a military leader. An especially unseemly role in this regard belonged to the writing of K. Ye. VOROSHILOV -- "Stalin and the Red Army" (1929), "Stalin and the Development of the Red Army" (1939), "Stalin and the Armed Forces of the USSR" (1951), and "Comrade Stalin's Answer to Comrade Razin's Letter" (1947). For the sake of magnifying Stalin's role in the Civil War and in the building of the Red Army in subsequent years, Voroshilov's writings distorted the true historical facts and the figure of Stalin emerged in the front rank. Stalin himself made the unprecedented announcement that Lenin had not left us any heritage of guiding theories on military questions which we should accept as guidance.

Only after the historical decisions of the 20th CPSU Congress, because of measures taken by the Central Committee to abolish the personality cult, the dogmatic standstill in the development of Marxist-Leninist theory was overcome; there began a new study of Lenin's ideological heritage, including its military theoretical aspects.

The Party's Central Committee created exceptionally favorable conditions for the study of Marxism and Leninism by the broad masses of the Soviet people. New issues of Lenin's, Engels', and Marx's works were prepared these included most valuable documents published for the first time on those which had become bibliographic rarities.

Great assistance in the study of Lenin's heritage on military-theory was furnished by publication of collections of Lenin's works, including "V. I. Lenin On War, The Army, and Military Science" (1957), and V. I. Lenin "Working Letters; 1917-1920" (1957), which contained Lenin's statements on the basic problems of defense of the socialist state. These included the organization, training, indoctrination and

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the Soviet Armed Forces; 1917-1964⁽⁶⁾ and others. Large groups of military theory and scientific workers of the central administrations of the Ministry of Defense participated in completing these works.

Thus it may be said that the Soviet military-theory cadres have done much work in overcoming the harmful effects of the Stalin personality cult and in recreating the true historical role of V. I. Lenin in the development of Soviet military science and in the organization of the socialist state's defense. This work has played an essential role in the ideological and political indoctrination of our military cadres, in raising the theoretical level of military-scientific work, and in the creative solution of many cardinal problems of Soviet military science.

In the interests of a further study and creative application of Lenin's heritage of military theory, it is necessary to clarify the unsolved tasks in this area of military-scientific work. This should be accomplished on the basis of a critical analysis of the works which have appeared recently on this subject. This is the way the book by a group of authors under the editorship of V. G. TSVETKOV, On Lenin's Heritage of Military Theory, must be reviewed. (Moscow, Mil. Pub. House, 1964, 288 pages.) (7)

First of all it must be noted that, in compiling their work, the authors clearly understood that the stage of simple repetition of Lenin's military theories has passed. The introduction to the book states the wholly correct thought that the task of developing and studying Lenin's heritage is not a simple systematization of material. There is a convincing reference to Lenin's own statements on people's attitude to a heritage of the past. Lenin taught that a heritage must not be preserved as archivists preserve an old document, but rather it must be protected and creatively developed (Compl. Collected Works, Vol. 2, p. 542).

The book makes an attempt to show the further creative development of Lenin's ideas on war, the army, and military science. Almost every chapter has sections dedicated to an interpretation of Lenin's ideas as applied to modern conditions. Such an approach by researchers to the development of a theme merits support and approval.

It is also necessary to rate positively the authors' attempt to include in one book a complete presentation of the basic trends in the military-theoretical activity of V. I. Lenin. The book has chapters which present Lenin's ideas on the causes and nature of wars in the imperialist epoch, on the armed defense of the socialist Fatherland, and on the military organization of the Soviet state.

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Special chapters are devoted to such important problems, as Lenin's development of the principles of Soviet military science, the development of Soviet military art, and Lenin's concept of the role of the country's economic and moral-political capabilities and their use in war. It is natural that the discussion of such cardinal military-theoretical problems demanded much intensive effort and creative research from the authors.

In evaluating the work by the authors' group, it must be said that as a whole they have made a useful contribution which will assist a large number of military cadres to familiarize themselves with the tremendous wealth of military theoretical knowledge left to us in V. I. Lenin's heritage.

In my opinion, the best chapters are those which present Lenin's ideas on the defense of the socialist Fatherland and on the military organization of the Soviet state. There is detailed material in the chapter which analyzes the role of V. I. Lenin in the development of Soviet military art. Lenin's ideas are presented in the form of ample factual material; they are shown in action, and their tremendous mobilizing force is emphasized. The book contains new, interesting statements by V. I. Lenin on the country's economic capabilities and their utilization in war (chapter 7). The essence of wartime economy is thoroughly presented.

However, solely in the interests of further creative study of Lenin's heritage concerning military theory, it must be said that the book under review is not a step forward in comparison with earlier publications. Its main content, as before, remains the systematization of and commentary on Lenin's material. The authors' intention to show the significance of Lenin's ideas on the development and improvement of Soviet military science was not fully achieved. Current factual material, contained in special sections of the chapters, is inadequate. It is not solely a question of quantity, but rather the fact that it is mostly of a general, declarative nature. As a rule, current problems are posed, but they are not solved. This, in my opinion, is the most essential shortcoming of the book. To a certain degree, it applies to all chapters. I will cite several examples.

Chapter 5, "V. I. Lenin's Creation of the Principles of Soviet Military Science," contains a special section, "Lenin's Heritage of Military Theory is a Guide Line for the Further Development of Soviet Military Science." Unfortunately, it gives no answers to the questions posed; the section contains the most general theories which will hardly enrich the reader with new knowledge. Here is a small excerpt which characterizes the style of the section: "For a correct understanding of the peculiar features of a possible nuclear rocket war

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military theoretical heritage is necessary, as well as the ability to apply Lenin's ideas and instructions in a creative manner to the analysis of current military affairs and ways of developing them" (page 180). The statement is, undoubtedly, correct but it should be proved and not merely declared. In the same chapter, there are very few examples of creative application by Soviet military science of Lenin's heritage to the solution of modern military theory problems. It is true that at times the authors attempt to give examples, but they do so without the required scientific argumentation and not always correctly.

For example, one of the laws of modern war is the increasing role of the people's masses. The reader awaits a well reasoned answer to the question concerning the factors behind this law. In addition to a theoretical formulation of the question it is necessary to give convincing, factual, comparative data on the increasing numerical strength of armies, on the number of countries which participated in the last wars, the increase in the number of persons working in the rear per one fighter, etc. In the book nothing is said about this. After citing V. I. Lenin's well-known theories that wars are now conducted by the people, the authors state: "In modern wars, the decisive role of people's masses is determined by their growing significance in public production and their increasing activity in the state's political life. It is also made possible by the increased requirements of war on the economic, political, and moral capabilities of the social structure of the belligerent countries" (p. 159).

I will cite another example of the insufficiently argued approach to problems of modern war. Speaking of the significance of the time factor as related to the introduction of mass destruction weapons, the authors state, incidentally, that: "The factor of space now does not have the same significance as before" (p.149). But what is the real significance of space in a future war? War has now achieved a tremendous spatial scope; it embraces all continents of the earth in its orbit. Therefore, it appears to me that under conditions of a thermo-nuclear war the advantage will be with that country which possesses the larger territory and consequently the greater survivability for its economic and military potential. The tremendous spatial scope of a future war has required the creation, improvement and development of weapons of destruction which are capable of effective performance over any distance. It is also possible that the imperialists will attempt to expand the scope of war beyond the boundaries of the earth into space.

The correct methodological approach to a study of V. I. Lenin's heritage of military theory is of vital importance. The role of the leader in the development of military theory and practice cannot be

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problems. Lenin's military-theoretical heritage includes general philosophical theories which are the ideological theoretical, and methodological foundation for Soviet military science. The book does not emphasize that the basic ideas of the dialectical-materialist understanding of theory are the key to a scientific explanation of the laws governing military development. A formalistic approach to the study of Lenin's heritage, with mere citing of authority, or an artificial application of Lenin's theories on various matters to military problems, cannot be permitted. Unfortunately, deficiencies of this nature are found in the book under review.

At times, the authors mechanically transfer the laws governing revolutionary class struggle to cover armed conflict. In describing the objective causes of armed conflict, the authors state: "The existence of laws and their action are determined by certain objective factors (basic, constant factors), which have a direct influence on the development and outcome of war. In speaking of the fates of revolutions and of the successful outcome of class struggle, Lenin stated that these depend on a number of objective factors -- economic, financial, military, and political." (p. 149)

Such a direct transfer of laws governing war to laws governing revolutions is hardly acceptable. Both have objective causes, but they have specific characteristics which cannot be equated.

The same error is made by the authors in their approach to the question of forms of conflict. "The task of the Communist Party in the field of military theory, as defined by Lenin, consists of presenting a scientific synthesis of the experience of the struggling masses; discovering and mastering the best forms of conflict; and arming the masses with knowledge of the most progressive and effective methods of armed conflict which best meet the situation and the requirements of military technology and science." (p. 185). In confirmation of this correct statement there is an excerpt from V. I. Lenin's work, Partisan Warfare, in which it is stated that Marxism "recognizes the most varied forms of struggle; it does not 'invent' them but only analyzes, organizes, and gives recognition to those forms of struggle by revolutionary classes which occur spontaneously during a movement" (Compl. Coll. Works, Vol. 14, p.1).

It is quite obvious that these theories of V. I. Lenin are related to forms of the revolutionary struggle of the masses. The methods and forms of warfare have their own specific characteristics. Actual life provides only the prerequisites -- political, economic, or military-technical -- which make it possible for specific forms and methods of struggle to develop. New forms of warfare do not arise spontaneously.

they are developed by military science. The book essentially restricts military science to a simple summarization of the practice of past wars. Accordingly, it follows that military science cannot create a scientific theory for a future war.

In speaking of military science, consideration must be given to one of its important features in comparison with other sciences. It can make only limited use of practical experience and experimentation. Troop exercises and maneuvers on various scales and the testing of weapons and combat equipment present only simulated material in comparison with the real situation of war. Psychologically, the participants [of maneuvers] are in a peaceful frame of mind and they are in no mortal danger. Therefore military science, even though it is based on the experience of past wars and on military practice, develops the theory of a future war by the logical method, which is a powerful instrument of world cognition and scientific foresight. By using the logical method, K. Marx created the theory of cost, and Lenin developed the new theory of socialist revolution.

The discussion of laws governing armed conflict, as presented in the book, suffers from a certain underestimation of the subjective factor. After properly stressing the objective nature of the laws of armed struggle, the authors fail to pay sufficient attention to the fact that the exploitation of these laws depends on the conscious activity of the people and on the technological and economic conditions. Several times the book emphasizes that Marx, Engels, and Lenin viewed armed conflict, be it an uprising or a war, as an art.

The significance of this theory is that it provides a scientific criterion for evaluating the role of the subjective factor in armed conflict. The representatives of that art are always the military leaders, whose skill plays an important part in achieving victory.

Our military-theory cadres clearly realize that research of Lenin's ideological heritage is a very important and responsible aspect of military-scientific work. It requires a thoroughly scientific approach, adherence to principles and a meticulous attitude toward each of Lenin's theories. Unfortunately, there are some inaccuracies in the book under review.

V. I. Lenin made such an enormous contribution to the creative development of Marxism that there is no need to credit him with something that was done before his time. Thus, the introduction states: "Lenin was the first to reveal and prove in a comprehensive manner, the interrelationship of war and politics" (p.8), even though it is a fact that Marx and Engels revealed that interrelationship and gave a scientific evaluation of wars prior to the period of monopolistic capitalism as a continuation of politics by various classes and states. V. I. Lenin defended these theories in the struggle against opportunists of

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the imperialist epoch.

The author makes another inaccurate statement in the introduction by saying that "the initial theories on the relationship between war and politics, and on war as a continuation of politics, are presented in the work Socialism and War, written in July and August 1915" (pp. 8-9). It appears from this that the initial theories on the relationship between war and politics were not developed before August 1915. But this is not correct. As noted above, these theories had been formulated by Marx and Engels in the middle of the 19th century. V. I. Lenin presented a thorough analysis of wars of the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century at the beginning of his revolutionary activity. He characterized these wars as imperialist actions and as the expression of imperialist politics of expansion. During the Russian-Japanese War, Lenin wrote a number of brilliant theoretical works in which he presented thorough arguments for the relationship between war and politics.

The book contains annoying errors in giving the publication dates of some of Lenin's works. The book, Materialism and Empirio-criticism, was dated 1916 (p. 143); and the lecture "War and Revolution" was dated 1907 (p. 162). Actually, the first named work appeared in 1909, and the lecture was read in 1917 and published in 1929.

It is also necessary to draw attention to the discussion of Lenin's style of work. Here there should not be even the slightest inaccuracy in describing V. I. Lenin. In this regard, phrases such as "Lenin demanded" (pp. 195, 196, 203, and others) should not be used. One of the characteristics of Lenin's style of strategic leadership is the fact that he did not impose his will on anyone. His suggestions on essential problems in the conduct of war were presented for discussion to organs of collective leadership and only then were they formulated in appropriate directives. The implementation of accepted decisions and directives was another matter. Here Lenin demonstrated exceptional firmness and exactingness.

It is understandable that the authors wished to present a clear and convincing portrayal of V. I. Lenin as a military leader. But this must be done with great tact. Certain expressions found in the book do not contribute to the proper solution of this task (pp. 20, 27, 35, 39 and others).

In my opinion, the authors commit a serious error of omission by completely ignoring the way in which Lenin's ideas were creatively used in the military and scientific activities of Lenin's students,

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strength of his genius was that his ideas possessed tremendous vital force. They aroused the broad masses to creative effort.

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A whole galaxy of talented military leaders arose on the basis of Lenin's ideas - M. V. Frunze, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, S. S. Kamenev, B. M. Shaposhnikov, and others who in their practical activity and scientific research creatively developed Soviet military science.

An essential shortcoming of the book under review is the fact that it does not always have a sharply critical approach to bourgeois military theories. For example, it does not emphasize that Lenin's development of the principles of Soviet military science and of military organization occurred during a sharp ideological conflict with the Mensheviks, Trotskyites, "leftist" Communists, and opportunists of the Second International. Except for a few general phrases, the reader will find nothing on this subject in the book. The authors frequently cite Lenin's theories on the necessity of studying the enemy, but they are not guided by them. Their criticism of modern bourgeois theory appears incidental. It does not arm the reader with knowledge of the reactionary essence and the anti-Communist trend of military doctrine of imperialist countries. What can the reader gain from such a general statement as; "Soviet military science has developed in a decisive and unrelenting struggle against obsolete and reactionary tenets of bourgeois military science. It fought and is fighting against bourgeois ideology and methodology, against idealism and a metaphysical, dogmatic approach to the solution of military problems" (p. 134). Unfortunately, the book uses a simplified approach to criticism of bourgeois theories, merely listing a number of bourgeois theoreticians and giving a sweeping evaluation of them as reactionaries and idealists, (pp. 145, 166). Our military cadres must know not only the military and economic potentials of a probable enemy, but also his ideology and military theory. The book does not help to solve this problem.

A serious reproach should also be made to the editors of the book. There are many repetitions, careless formulations, factual inaccuracies, and discrepancies in terminology. The book is not improved by its didactic tone, high-sounding phrases, and abundance of general declarative passages. A book is not a collection of directives. Its purpose is to give the reader a certain amount of knowledge, already established by science. Certainly, the authors may draw the reader's attention to some unsolved questions. But very frequently instead of an answer to current questions, the book only presents problems or declarative, general theories, (pp. 28, 55, 152, 179-180, 212, 226, and others).

ON V. I. Lenin's Heritage of Military Theory. I would not like the authors to gain the impression that these critical comments detract from the positive and useful work. My purpose was to indicate shortcomings which are typical not only for this book and thereby to help researchers in a further thorough study of this important military-theoretical problem.

Despite the significant scope attained by the study of V. I. Lenin's military-theoretical heritage in recent years, we have still not made the transition from a systematization of Lenin's statements to an analysis of Lenin's theories on individual problems.

The October and November 1964 Plenums of the Party Central Committee emphasized with special force the growing significance of scientific leadership in the building of Communism. This also applies wholly to military developments. The tremendous, revolutionary, military-technological transformations present increasing demands for scientific verification of many new military-theoretical and practical problems. In our time, V. I. Lenin's statement that "without science it is impossible to build a modern army" (Compl. Coll. Works, Vol. 40, p. 183) has attained even greater meaning.

The theoretical and methodological basis for scientific leadership of military organization and development of military science is Marxist-Leninist theory, and Lenin's heritage of military theory. It is therefore important to expand the scope of the study of V. I. Lenin's military theories, and to include not only military philosophers, historians, and economists, but also military specialists in this work. This will prevent a one-sided treatment of Lenin's ideas and increase attention to the study of Lenin's views on problems in military science and military art.

The main efforts of theoretical cadres, in my opinion, must be concentrated on the theoretical application of Lenin's ideas to a solution of the most urgent problems of Soviet military science. Lenin's military-theoretical heritage as related to present conditions is the most important aspect in the study of this inexhaustible ideological wealth. A declarative, commentator-style method must be resolutely and persistently overcome. Our military-theoretical cadres must boldly solve questions concerning methods and forms for conducting thermo-nuclear war; this should be done on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and a creative application of its theories.

Some recommendations for practical and theoretical activity should become a tradition in each book and each scientific work. Military science must perform its duty on the basis of the triumphant

theories, to arm our military cadres with progressive theory on the military defense of the Soviet Union and the worldwide socialist

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Notes:

1. M. V. FRUNZE, Selected Works, Voenizdat, 1950, p. 337.
2. D. M. GRINISHIN, Voyennaya Deyatel'nost' V. I. Lenina (Military Activity of V. I. Lenin), Voenizdat, 1957; N. F. KUZ'MIN, V. I. Lenin Vo Glave Oborony Sovetskoy Strany, 1918-1920 gg. (V. I. Lenin At the Head of Defense of the Soviet Union, 1918-1920), Voenizdat, 1958; I. I. VLASOV, V. I. Lenin i Stroitel'stvo Sovetskoy Armii (V. I. Lenin and the Building of the Soviet Army), Voenizdat, 1958.
3. Sbornik Materialov Posvyashchennykh 90-letiyu So Dnya Rozhdeniya V. I. Lenina (Collection of Materials Dedicated to the 90th Anniversary of V. I. Lenin's Birthday), Published by the Academy of the General Staff, 1960; Works of the Military Political Academy imeni Lenin, 1960, No 30.
4. Voyennaya Strategiya (Military Strategy), under the editorship of V. D. SOKOLOVSKIY, Voenizdat, 1962.
5. S. N. KOZLOV, M. V. SMIRNOV, I. S. BAZ', and P. A. SIDOROV, O Sovetskoy Voennoy Nauke (On Soviet Military Science), Voenizdat, 1964.
6. KPSS i Stroitel'stvo Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil 1917-1964 (The CPSU and the Building of the Soviet Armed Forces, 1917-1964), Voenizdat, 1965.
7. O Voenno-Teoreticheskom Nasledii V. I. Lenina (On the Military-Theoretical Heritage of V. I. Lenin), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1964, 288 pages.